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Aimless Science 
 
This paper argues that talk of ‘the aim of science’ should be avoided in the philosophy 
of science, with special reference to the way that van Fraassen sets up the difference 
between scientific realism and constructive empiricism. It also argues that talking 
instead of ‘what counts as success in science as such’ is unsatisfactory. The paper 
concludes by showing what this talk may be profitably replaced with, namely specific 
claims concerning science that fall into the following categories: descriptive, 
evaluative, normative, and definitional. There are two key advantages to this proposal. 
First, realism and its competitors may be understood to consist of highly nuanced 
variants. Second, scientific realism and its competitors may be understood as 
something other than ‘all or nothing’ theses about science. More particularly, one may 
accept that there are general claims concerning science in some of the identified 
categories, but deny that there are such claims in the others.  
 
Keywords: aim of science, scientific realism, scientific progress, van Fraassen, 
constructive empiricism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Talk of ‘the aim of science’ is widespread in the literature on general philosophy of 
science, and commonplace, in particular, in discussions of scientific method and 
scientific realism; see, for example, van Fraassen (1980: 8–9), Newton-Smith (1981: 
ch. 3), Popper (1983), Laudan (1984), and Sankey (2000). But should this talk be 
taken literally? And if not, does the metaphor serve any useful purpose? 
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I hope to convince you that the answers to both these questions lie in negative, and 
also that the issues at stake in the general philosophy of science become clearer when 
we adopt a non-teleological mode of discourse. In fact, talk of aims in the philosophy 
of science is the source of considerable confusion, among professional philosophers 
as well as students, as I have experienced first-hand on numerous occasions.1 One 
such recent occasion, a research seminar, prompted me to write this paper. In 
particular, the notion that ‘the aim of science’ is some kind of function from the aims 
of individual scientists, in doing science, was assumed by many of the audience. As 
we will see, however, this is not what is typically intended by the phrase in the 
philosophy of science. And in any event, even if there is such a sense in which one 
may legitimately speak of ‘the aim of science’, this is a matter for empirical 
sociological (or socio-historical) study. (It should also be carefully defined, e.g. in 
terms of a clearly specified aggregation function of individual aims, if it is to be 
rendered an object of that kind of empirical study. But to the best of my knowledge, 
no such definition exists.) 
 
I will proceed by discussing the most highly-influential discussion of the aim of 
science in recent decades, namely that provided by van Fraassen (1980), which has 
had a considerable impact on subsequent work in general philosophy of science and 
beyond.2 But before I continue, I should like to note that van Fraassen is, in one sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I have also used such talk, albeit somewhat unwillingly, in Rowbottom (2010). Interestingly, concerns 
involving the use of ‘the aim of science’ were responsible for major revisions of the initial version of 
that paper being requested. The second section, which comprises around one thousand words, was 
produced in response. 
2 Google scholar helps to give a rough measure; the book has been cited almost 3000 times. Compare 
Popper (1983), which has only been cited 600 times, and Laudan (1984), which has only been cited 
300 times. 
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an undeserving target; many other authors, beforehand and thereafter, have used the 
phrase without any serious discussion, and/or in confusing fashions.  
 
Here are some brief examples. First, Cooper (1964), in a paper on ‘The Aims of 
Science’, simply fails to discuss what the phrase is supposed to mean. Second, Popper 
(1983: 132), in a book with ‘Aim of Science’ in the title, writes only:  
 
To speak of ‘the aim’ of scientific activity may perhaps sound a little naïve; 
for clearly, different scientists have different aims, and science itself 
(whatever that may mean) has no aims. I admit all this. Yet when we speak of 
science, we do seem to feel, more or less clearly, that there is something 
characteristic of scientific activity, and since scientific activity looks pretty 
much like a rational activity, and since a rational activity must have some aim, 
the attempt to describe the aim of science may not be entirely futile. 
 
A more recent introductory discussion by Newton-Smith fares no better. The term is 
introduced as follows: 
 
At what is science especially successful? ... Are theories just tools for 
predicting and manipulating the world? … This [is] controversy about the aim 
of science. (Newton-Smith 2000: 3) 
 
Just two pages later, Newton-Smith (2000: 5) writes: ‘Much philosophy of science 
concerns issues of aims and methods. In the course of pursuing our aim (whatever it 
may be) using our rich range of methods, we have crafted descriptive and explanatory 
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tools…’ But science can be ‘especially successful’ at something without us pursuing 
that end; and similarly, theories can be ‘just tools for predicting and manipulating the 
world’ even if all scientists think otherwise, and pursue a different end. It is easy to 
see how a student—and even a professional philosopher—reading this introduction 
may emerge confused. A simple and effective solution, I will urge, is to ditch talk of 
‘the aim(s) of science’.3 
 
2. Van Fraassen on the Aim of Science: A Critique 
 
Van Fraassen (1980: 8, 12) characterizes scientific realism and his alternative, 
constructive empiricism, as involving two competing claims about the aim of science: 
 
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world 
is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. 
 
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and 
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. 
 
Now if the aim of science were understood to be determinable by looking to the aims 
of individual scientists in doing science—what they hoped to achieve, be it fame, 
fortune, finding the truth, or finding empirically adequate theories—then the 
difference of opinion would be easily settled by sociological study. The appropriate 
procedure is simple. State what has to be true of the aims of individual scientists in 
order for the overarching ‘aim of science’ to be x, and then study the aims of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Note also that science may be ‘especially successful’ at achieving some end even when achieving said 
end is not constitutive of the activity. The significance of this will become apparent in due course. 
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individual scientists. For example, one might (rather crudely) take some x to be an 
aim of science if at least 50% of scientists hope to achieve (or get closer towards) x by 
doing science. And one might take some y to be the aim of science if it is the single 
most prevalent aim of scientists in doing science.4 Then simple quantitative 
investigations, e.g. appropriate survey work, would bring to an end the interminable 
debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. (At least, that’s for the 
time being. On such views, the aim of science could change over time.) In the words 
of Rosen (1994: 144): 
 
A literal interpretation… would… have it that SR [scientific realism] and CE 
[constructive empiricism] are opposing proposals about what scientists 
actually think. 
 
We would also take a dim view of claims about the aim(s) of science based on limited 
personal experience, or on armchair speculation (and hence of van Fraassen 1980, and 
the resultant philosophical exchanges on the aim of science). One can also find many 
claims that appear remarkable on this literal view, such as: ‘The establishing of 
general laws is an invariant and focal aim of all science’ (Cooper 1964: 328). It is 
highly dubious that this goes for biology, for example; see Keller (2007) and Author 
[2011c]. 
 
This said, it should be of little surprise that van Fraassen (1980) does not take ‘the aim 
of science’ to reflect the aims of scientists; that the literal interpretation ‘just can’t be 
right’ (Rosen 1994: 144).  Van Fraassen (1980: 8) explains this by using chess as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Much more refined aggregation functions may be possible, e.g. after those used in social 
epistemological contexts; see List and Puppe (2007). But this will not change the underlying point 
here; the result of applying such a function would have to be determined by spade work. 
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analogy for science. The aim of chess, we are told, is to give checkmate. The aims of 
individual chess players may be quite different: to become famous, rich, or simply to 
have some mental stimulation. And even if all chess players just so happened to share 
the same aim, this would not be sufficient for it to constitute an aim of chess. Thus as 
he explains elsewhere, constructive empiricism should not be associated with the 
claim that: 
 
(all or most) real scientists aim to construct empirically adequate theories, and 
believe the theories they accept to be empirically adequate…  (Van Fraassen 
1994: 180) 
 
So how should talk of the aim of science be understood? Van Fraassen (1980: 8) adds 
only that: 
 
What the aim is determines what counts as success in the enterprise as such; 
and this aim may be pursued for any number of reasons. Also, in calling 
something the aim, I do not deny that there are other subsidiary aims which 
may or may not be means to that end. 
 
Note that van Fraassen’s claim, here, is that the aim determines what counts as 
success. It is not that what counts as success determines the aim. But in the case of 
chess, this appears backwards. On the contrary, just because giving checkmate to 
one’s opponent counts as success—i.e. winning—in chess, it is the aim of chess to 
give checkmate to one’s opponent. In any event—and here is the fundamental point—
we may describe chess quite adequately without saying that it has an aim. Instead, we 
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may state the rules of the game, and what it takes to win (or to succeed). No mention 
of any aim of the game is required. Success suffices. 
 
But how about pulling the trick of saying that chess players, like scientists, have the 
shared personal aim of succeeding? This is precisely what van Fraassen (1994: 182) 
appears to do at one stage:  
 
[S]cientists with their very different motives and convictions participate in a 
common enterprise, defined by its own internal criteria of success, and this 
success is their common aim ‘inside’ this cluster of diverging personal aim. 
How else could they be said to be collaborating in a common enterprise? The 
question is only what that defining criterion of success is. 
 
At best, however, this trick suggests that all philosophers of science should agree on 
what the aim of science is, namely to succeed at science. But if that is so, then there is 
no genuine dispute over aims at all, and it is a mistake—or at least, highly 
misleading—to express the difference between scientific realism and constructive 
empiricism in those terms. It would again be better, surely, to refer only to different 
accounts of what constitutes success in science.  
 
Besides, the claim that many (or most) people who play chess do so with the aim of 
winning is sociological. (If you doubt this, then you must think that this claim is not 
open to empirical refutation. It is. For example, I have played many games in chess 
tournaments in which I have aimed for an early draw, e.g. by complicating the 
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position in the middle game and unnerving the opponent; and I am happy with the 
draws I have achieved against superior players.5) 
 
But might we not stick with the notion of success, as a replacement for the talk of 
aims? Not on the strength of van Fraassen’s initial analogy, in so far as science bears 
little significant resemblance to chess.6 First and foremost, in chess, what it takes to 
win is stipulated as part of the game design. This is not so in science. Second, it is 
dubious that the rules of science are enough to define it, or indeed play a definitional 
role at all, in the way that the rules of chess serve to define that game. In chess, to fail 
to know any of the rules is to be unable to play the game; to fail to know some of 
them means (at least) that one is unable to play the game properly. Similarly, to know 
the rules but intentionally violate them is to fail to play the game, but instead to adopt 
the semblance of doing so (e.g. to cheat).7 Third, and finally, science involves groups 
and communities; so at best, it may only be understood as a team game.8  
 
In relation to the second and third of the points above, consider that there are several 
possible answers to van Fraassen’s rhetorical question, “How else could they be said 
to be collaborating in a common enterprise [unless there were a common criterion of 
success]?” One short answer, for instance, is that many scientists simply obey 
instructions to perform particular local tasks (and collaborate in the same way a 
private does with an officer); and while they may wish to succeed in following those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It may be objected that I would have taken a win if the opportunity arose, e.g. if I spotted a way to 
force mate in a small number of moves. I accept this. But I was still playing with the aim of not losing, 
rather than the aim of winning. 
6 Kuhn (1996) infamously used a chess analogy too, in order to illustrate how normal science is a 
puzzle solving process. However, he elsewhere argued that normal scientists rely on pattern 
recognition, rather than rule following. See Bird (2000: 71–75) and Rowbottom (2011a). 
7 See also Resnik (1993). 
8 This final element of disanalogy is perhaps not as troublesome as the others; see Rowbottom (2010: 
211). 
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instructions and performing those tasks, this hardly suggests that they want to succeed 
(or contribute to success) in some further global sense. Another reaction to van 
Fraassen’s question is to simply deny that all scientists are collaborating in a common 
enterprise; on the contrary, many of them are competing. My overarching point, here, 
is that there is a chasm between what counts as ‘success’ for any given individual or 
research group and what counts as ‘success’ for the whole; and in fact, some will 
legitimately question the very idea that there is such as thing as ‘success’ for the 
whole of science, above and beyond different local criteria for ‘success’ in different 
areas of (what we just so happen to classify as) science.9 
 
The only obvious way to rejoin, and urge that there genuinely is something 
philosophically distinct that counts as success in science, is show how to determine 
what this is. Perhaps rather than asking scientists what their own aims are, i.e. going 
into sociology, we might look to other empirical data? In fact, van Fraassen (1994: 
186) notes this kind of possibility by considering a different analogy, between science 
and war, which is rather better than his earlier one between science and chess:  
 
Clausewitz’ doctrine of war: [the aim of] war is the continuation of diplomacy 
by other means. This does imply: 
 
the solider’s aim, the criterion of his [sic] success, is the continuation of 
[his/her country’s] diplomacy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This is closely related to the distinction, made by Magnus and Callender (2004: 321), between retail 
and wholesale approaches: ‘Wholesale realism seeks to explain the success of science in general; 
wholesale anti-realism seeks to explain the history of science in general. Dissolving the debate… 
involves attending to the retail arguments without trying to settle the debate in an all-or-nothing, 
wholesale manner.’ I disagree, however, with the suggestion that wholesale anti-realism concerns 
history, rather than success; and I believe that this is illustrated by van Fraassen’s emphasis on success. 
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Van Fraassen continues by asking us to imagine that we can find no solider who says 
that her aim is to continue her country’s diplomacy. What then? Is Clausewitz 
refuted? Van Fraassen (1994: 186–187) thinks not, because some of the soldiers, at 
least, understand what war is really all about: 
 
I do not mean to rely on this as an example of false consciousness. What 
happens in war flows from the conscious self-understanding of the 
participants. It also flows from the aims, intentions, and beliefs of the actual 
participants. But the two are not the same. I think that the soldiers or at least 
the generals understand the business of war very well. If they are sincere in 
their statement of their own aims and intentions, then it follows, I think, that 
they are convinced that pursuing those is compatible (and perhaps best 
combined) with the continuation of their country’s diplomacy by force of 
arms. 
 
So one might think that we can sociologically probe scientists’ understandings of 
science without asking them about their own aims in doing science. For example: 
 
Approach some scientists you know and mention some of their most valued 
scientific colleagues. Then tell them… that as a matter of fact those colleagues 
are not pursuing the aim of finding true theories, but are privately concerned 
only to construct empirically adequate ones. Now ask them whether, with this 
new information in hand, they still regard those men and women as real 
scientists? (Van Fraassen 1994: 187) 
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Several obvious variations on this experiment are possible; one may ask the 
interviewees to think of figures from the history of science, or even from future 
science, in place of colleagues. But this is not the way that van Fraassen (1994: 188) 
wants to go: ‘I… do not equate the aim of science… even with all or most scientists’ 
understanding of what science is.’  
 
So how about answering the question with reference to publications, citations, and 
other relevant awards? Or one could look a little deeper; one could look for patterns in 
the kind of papers that are (or have been) well-cited or otherwise lauded. And one 
might gain, as a result, an insight into what kind of work is (or has been) actually 
successful in science (above and beyond what kind of work is thought, by a majority 
of scientists, to be successful). This may be understood as a kind of systematic 
approach, which bears similarities to the ‘aims as characteristics’ option which Resnik 
(1993: 229–230) considers to be the best available.10 The underlying idea is that the 
system favours (or has favoured) some kinds of activity, but not others. Yet there 
would be serious problems in conducting this kind of research. For example, why 
should we expect the relevant differences to show up in the papers, without an 
interpretative spin provided by realism or one of its competitors? Perhaps papers that 
posit new theoretical entities are (or have been) popular, for instance. But does this 
show that the discovery of such entities is (or was) a scientific priority? Or does it just 
happen to be the case that such theoretical posits are usually bound up with significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Resnik (1993: 230) is mainly concerned with how aims might justify methodological rules. And he 
notes, correctly, that this view will not do: ‘If we think of aims as characteristics which describe 
scientific conduct, then aims cannot justify methodological rules because these characteristics are too 
general and abstract to offer genuine guidance.’ Via this different route, he also comes to the 
conclusion that (1993: 231): ‘philosophers of science might achieve more useful results by shifting 
their attention away from the aims of science… [which] seem to have little… effect on working 
scientists’. 
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new empirical predictions? And in any event, even disregarding such difficulties, one 
would end up with the question: is (or was) the way the system set up good or bad? 
The worry is that the realist will say one thing, and the anti-realist another, under 
many key circumstances (e.g. if we somehow learned that saving the phenomena was 
what was most rewarded). So we would not have penetrated into the real differences 
that divide the two camps.11 
 
Let me put the point more bluntly. The worry is that talk of some kind of essential 
‘success in science’ papers over the genuine division between many realists and anti-
realists. In particular, a difference in value judgements, concerning what kinds of 
inquiry are worthwhile, is (arguably) instead treated as if it were a disagreement on a 
matter of fact about science. For van Fraassen, for instance, the valuable product is 
empirically adequate theories. For many realists who disagree, the valuable product is 
true (and empirically adequate) theories. And rather than cast the difference as being 
‘For van Fraassen, science would be finished when it had empirically adequate 
theories of everything, although it might not be finished for the realist’, we can 
instead say ‘For van Fraassen, there would be no value in continuing to inquire in 
some domain when one had empirically adequate theories, although there might be 
for the realist (if, for example, those empirically adequate theories were known not be 
true)’. So the presumption of ‘success in the enterprise as such’ (like that of ‘the aim 
of science’) sets the debate up in a way that is potentially highly misleading. 
 
I therefore suggest not only that talk of ‘the aim of science’ should be ditched, but 
also that ‘what counts as success in science as such’ is an inadequate replacement. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is the kind of problem that van Fraassen (1994) grapples with in closing. It is always open to a 
philosopher to maintain that some activity is not science because it does not have the correct features. 
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will now turn my attention to what to put in their place, and will propose a roomier 
framework in which the finer distinctions between specific realists and anti-realists 
can be made more readily apparent. 
 
3. Aims and Success: Lost in Translation 
 
So when a philosopher of science says ‘the aim of science is x’, what on earth might 
she mean? Like Bacon (1620: bk. II, §2) in the face of scholastic philosophy, I 
propose that we can profitably dispense with such teleological discourse, which 
‘rather corrupts than advances the sciences except such as have to do with human 
actions’. There are four distinct kinds of theses, each decidedly philosophical (rather 
than sociological) in character, which we may instead discuss: 
 
 Descriptive—‘What Science Can Be Expected To Do’—Theses 
 For example: 
(a) Science can reliably achieve x. 
(b) Science can make reliable progress towards x. 
(c) Science will achieve x. 
(d) Science has a higher objective probability of achieving x than any other of 
a peculiar class of alternatives, {x1, …, xn}. 
 
Evaluative—‘Why It’s Worth Doing Science’—Theses 
For example: 
(e) Science would not be worth doing if it could not reliably achieve x. 
(f) Science is only worth doing if it can reliably achieve x. 
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(g) Science is only worth doing if it will achieve x. 
(h) Science would no longer be worth doing if it achieved x. 
(i) Science is worth doing more if it can reliably achieve x than it would be if 
it could only reliably achieve any (or all) of a peculiar class of alternatives, 
{x1, …, xn}. 
 
Normative—‘What Scientists Should Do’—Theses 
For example: 
(j) Scientists should (as a community) strive to achieve x if they are able. 
(k) Each and every scientist should strive to make progress towards achieving 
x if he/she is able. 
 
Definitional—‘What Science Is’—Theses 
For example: 
(l) An activity counts as a science if it can reliably achieve x. 
(m) A branch of inquiry is not scientific if it cannot make reliable progress 
towards x. 
 
These lists of possible theses are just indicative; they are by no means exhaustive. 
Some of these types may also be connected; and there will be differences of opinion 
about how it is appropriate to connect them (especially when it comes to the 
definitional theses and the others). This is not the place to discuss such connections; 
instead, I want to suggest that this framework may be used to delineate, and clarify, 
the available spectrum of positions in what are normally called the realist and anti-
realist camps. 
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How about mapping the view of van Fraassen in this way?12 He denies (a)–(c) for x as 
truth or approximate truth; and I think, in so far as he is an anti-inductivist, that he 
should also deny these claims when x is empirical adequacy.13 I suspect, however, 
that he does endorse (b) for x as empirical adequacy; and I am also reasonably 
confident that he would endorse (d), when n is two, for x as empirical adequacy and x1 
and x2 as truth and approximate truth. In the evaluative domain, I take it that he would 
reject theses (e)–(g) for any of the standard options for x, such as truth, approximate 
truth, structural adequacy, and ‘empirical adequacy’. I believe, however, that he 
would endorse (h) for x as empirical adequacy.  I think he would also endorse a 
further thesis (f*) for x as empirical adequacy (if he does indeed endorse (b) for the 
same x): ‘Science is only worth doing if it can make reliable progress towards x’. 
 
In the normative dimension, I believe he says that (j) is true for empirical adequacy 
but not truth or approximate truth. And finally, on the definitional theses, I am not 
entirely sure where he stands; I suspect, however, that he would agree with me that 
we should not define science in terms of what it can achieve.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Otávio Bueno has suggested to me that his position might be best understood as concerning what’s 
constitutive of science. I need not deny this, however. Rather, I think that constitutive claims can be 
broken down into claims falling into the aforementioned categories (especially descriptive, evaluative, 
and definitional). 
13 In Rowbottom (2010, 2011b), I argue that this goes through from the point of view of evolutionary 
epistemology. 
14 Here’s my own view. I deny all of the first three descriptive theses, (a)–(c), where x is truth or 
approximate truth. I am also more of an anti-realist than most, in so far as I also deny these theses when 
x is structural adequacy, empirical adequacy, or even approximate empirical adequacy. (I am instead 
inclined toward thinking that (a) is true for x as ‘the elimination of empirically inadequate theories’; see 
Rowbottom (2010, 2011b).) Furthermore, I deny all of the first three evaluative theses, (e)–(g), when x 
takes any of the aforementioned values. On (h), however, I think that ‘empirical adequacy’, or even 
something less, will do the trick; for example, I see no value in discovering which of two completely 
empirically adequate theories is true (although I understand why others might see value here, at least in 
so far as they wish to satisfy their curiosity about how the world is). In the normative dimension, I deny 
(j) and (k) when x takes any of the aforementioned values except ‘the elimination of empirically 
inadequate theories’. In addition, if x is instead something like ‘save the phenomena relevant to our 
practical concerns in an economical fashion’ then I am inclined to endorse both. Finally, I reject (l) and 
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Realists, by way of contrast, are more inclined to think that true statements may be 
formed by letting x be ‘truth’ or ‘approximate truth’ in (a)–(c), (e)–(h), and (j)–(m). 
To be describable as a realist about science at all, it is plausible that a philosopher 
must think that at least one of these statements is true when this is done. And strong 
realists will think that many of these statements are true when this is done. As such, 
we have a rough and ready framework for measuring the strength of realist (or anti-
realist) commitment. (For example, some are descriptive realists only. Some are 
normative realists but not descriptive realists.) And all this without talking of the aims 
of science, or indeed of ‘what counts as success in science as such’.15 
 
It is also worth noting the extra freedom that the proposed framework provides, with 
respect to the difference between local and global issues—or what Magnus and 
Callender (2004) call retail and wholesale claims—which was raised earlier. For 
example, one might think that all of the descriptive questions can legitimately be 
answered globally (or wholesale), whereas none of the evaluative ones can. Or one 
might think that some descriptive questions can legitimately be answered globally, 
whereas others cannot. It is therefore possible to chart positions that are far more 
nuanced than those that can readily be appreciated by talking in terms of ‘aims’ 
and/or ‘success’. 
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(m) in so far as I do not think we should define science in terms of what it can (or could conceivably) 
achieve. (I do not discuss (d) or (i) because this would require an extensive digression.) 
15 In the normative dimension, naturally, we may be said to be discussing what we think scientists 
should aim for. But it is explicit, in this context, that we are discussing scientists. 
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